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POVERTY LAW AND EQUALITY RIGHTS
Preliminary Reflections
James C. Hatbaway*
The traditional governmental response to the phenomenon of
poverty has been the enactment of legislation to permit or effect
the transfer of some measure of economic resources to the poor.
From feudal times to the present, governments of our political
tradition have consistently embraced an economic definition of
poverty: the poor are identified by financial criteria and are
assisted by financial means. 1 The legislative evolution in regard to
poverty, based on this underlying economic premise, has achieved
only superficial advances. First, twentieth century legislation
incorporates a more humane standard of minimum acceptable
resource allotments. Second, the modern social welfare system
represents a somewhat more comprehensive and less stigmatizing
legislative bandage than were such earlier legal vehicles as the
regulation of begging, institutionalized almsgiving and workhouses.
The legislative developments to date have not, however, challenged
the economic conceptualization of poverty in our laws. Welfare,
unemployment insurance, workers' compensation and minimum
wages, while certainly progressive in comparison with the regu-
lation of mendicity, are premised on the notion that poverty can be
alleviated by a redirection of funds toward those in need. Even the
more progressive reactions to poverty which have been advocated
assume an economic definition of poverty. Programs that would
implement a significant redistribution of resources from the rich to
the poor by way of the establishment of a guaranteed income
and/or sharply progressive taxation system are really only sophisti-
cated versions of the Poor Laws in that they perpetuate the
economic focus of poverty legislation.
It is argued here that the legislative characterization of poverty as
an economic condition is a pernicious effort to disguise the
structural causes of poverty. It is further suggested that the most
effective role for poverty lawyers is the articulation of this
divergence between the real and professed objectives of poverty
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1. See, e.g. Podoluk, "Poverty and Income Adequacy", in
Reflections on Canadian Incomes (1979), at 275.
BILLET DE LA RIDACTION=
II y a quelque temps dj , le Bureau de direction de 1'Association
des cliniques juridiques de l'Ontario (A.C.3.O.) avait reconnu le
besoin de plus de recherche dans les domaines juridiques dans
lesquels oeuvrent les cliniques juridiques. Ce besoin a pris une
urgence toute nouvelle avec la proclamation de la Charte
canadienne des droits et des libertis dont la port6e apparaTt tout-a
fait extraordinaire en ce qui concerne les clients des cliniques. La
circulaire ("Newsletter") de l'Association des cliniques juridiques de
l'Ontario permet d~j un 6change r~gulier d'informations juridiques
mais ne constitue pas un vehicule ad~quat pour des articles de
fond.
Venant peu apr~s l'entr~e en vigueur de l'article 15 de la Charte, le
premier numero de la Revue des lois et des politiques sociales
devient r6alite. II apparait tout & fait approprie que ce premier
numro soit pr~sent6 sous forme de cahier special portant sur la
Charte et, en particulier, sur l'article 15.
En plus de susciter davantage de recherche au sein du r~seau des
cliniques, la Revue servira d'outil I'A.C.J.O. pour r6aliser son
engagement de renforcer les liens entre les cliniques, le barreau
prive, le milieu universitaire et les autres organismes engages dans
la r6forme des lois.
La Revue recherchera des articles traitant de sujets juridiques et
de questions relatives aux politiques sociales qui sous-tendent les
probl~mes juridiques de toutes les regions du Canada et d'ailleurs.
Un prejuge favorable existera favorisant tout article ayant un
intret pratique immdiat pour le personnel des cliniques. En plus
des articles qui paraissent dans ce premier numero, nous accuell-
lerons des rapports de cas et des r~sum~s de livres. On pr~voit que
la Revue paraltra annuellement. Si vous desirez pr6senter des
articles, veuillez communiquer avec Jack Fleming l'adresse
suivante:





Nous esp6rons recevoir bient8t des nouvelles de futurs cor-
respondants et les commentaires de lecteurs sur le contenu et la
presentation de cette publication.
Enf in, nous voulons remercier les auteurs des articles qui
paraissent dans ce premier num6ro pour des articles de qualit6
malgr6 le peu de temps qui leur a 6t6 accord6. Nous voulons
exprimer toute notre gratitude aux membres du comit6 consultatif
pour leur inestimable appui dans cette nouvelle entreprise.
Jack Fleming
David Shanks octobre 1985
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What mix of goods and services is required for survival or to meet
generally accepted norms? How much of an income differential
between the rich and the poor is socially permissible? At what
point can it be said that steps need to be taken to remedy a social
imbalance of revenue? All of these definitional approaches
necessarily involve value judgments made by predominantly non-
poor legislators and program administrators about the extent to
which it is legitimate to condone economic deprivation. Because
of the inherently amorphous character of economic definitions,
those in policy-making posts can readily expand or constrict the
range of persons classified as poor on the basis of arbitrary or self-
serving considerations. What is more, the statistical language
which clothes economic formulations of poverty gives them an
appearance of absoluteness and value neutrality, thus discouraging
public scrutiny of the underlying policy concerns.
Second, prevailing economic definitions of poverty ignore
differences in resources which arise from the existence of past
accumulations of wealth. By asking whether the poor have
sufficient funds to meet their needs, or indeed whether there is in
some sense a maldistribution of income, one avoids consideration
of the true extent of the economic imbalance between the poor and
the non-poor. Because all of the major economic definitions of
poverty look only at actual and/or future revenue, 8 they tacitly
sanction the preservation of historically acquired economic
advantages. While such an approach may be rationalized on the
basis of administrative practicality, the hegemony of the non-poor
is nonetheless reinforced by the limited purview of current
economic measures of poverty.
Third, and most important, economic definitions of poverty are of
limited utility because they are descriptive rather than explanatory
in nature. Merely knowing that a group of persons cannot meet its
needs, or is in some sense economically disadvantaged, provides no
insight on the meaning of poverty. A definition should express the
essential nature of poverty, and thereby offer an indication of the
common thread that unites those who are poor. Rather than
fulfilling this function, economic definitions emphasize the
symptoms of poverty and divert attention from the reasons that
the poor lack financial resources. The resultant legislative
8. See e.g. Special Senate Committee on Poverty, supra note 2,
at 199-218.
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initiatives tend to be largely superficial, with an emphasis on the
transfer of funds rather than on the elimination of the conditions
which give rise to income deficiency.
Poverty as a Structural Phenomenon
The persistent adherence to a definition of poverty that is arbi-
trary, of unduly limited scope and non-explanatory may seem
irrational. Adherents of the structural theory of poverty might
however argue that the use of the economic definition is an
effective means of binding the interests of the poor to those of the
non-poor without any risk of significant encroachment on the
latter's vested interests.
The structural or situational theory posits that poverty may be
most appropriately defined in terms of the structural imperatives
of a capitalist economic system. 9 Our model of economic activity
requires inequities in the distribution of wealth: there must be
persons with sufficient accumulations of capital to enable them to
create the means of production and there must be others who are
prepared to sell their labor to the capitalists. As such, there must
always be persons who are, at least in comparative terms, rich and
poor. While it is not argued here that there is no socio-economic
mobility, it is clear that those who begin life with the advantages
of wealth are favored in the quest to remain economically
advantaged; similarly, those who start in a comparatively dis-
advantaged position are, even assuming equivalent personal
dynamism, less ikely to achieve comparable financial success.
More important, even where particular individuals are able to
better their situations, there must be others who assume the role
of labor to these new capitalists. The very nature of the economic
system therefore perpetuates structural inequalities and gives rise
to a class of persons who, because of their position of comparative
economic disadvantage, may be classified as poor.
From this perspective, the economic definition of poverty and the
programs which have evolved in reliance on same are
unquestionably inadequate to alleviate poverty: transfers of
dollars do not in any sense effect changes to the structure of the
economic system. Moreover, by providing for the basic needs of
9. "[Poverty] is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to
their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly
individuated, capitalistic society": Lewis, 'The Culture of
Poverty" in Structured Inequality in Canada (1960), 140. See
also Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie" (1938), III Am.
Socio. R. 672.
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those most harshly oppressed, economically based social welfare
programs may effectively blunt demands for systemic reform as
the poor come to see their well-being as dependent in some sense
on the continued munificence of the non-poor. The result is
therefore ideal from the perspective of the capitalist class: the
potential for social upheaval is significantly lessened and the most
disquieting manifestations of systemic inequality are alleviated,
yet the advantaged position of the non-poor is only minimally
diminished and, in the long term, is effectively safeguarded.
If a structural definition of poverty were to be adopted, on the
other hand, the focus of our concern would shift to the eradication
of institutionalized barriers to equality of economic opportulxity.
Individualized concerns and immediate needs would necessarily
cede priority to collective endeavors designed to secure funda-
mental long-term gains.
The Response of Poverty Lawyers
Poverty lawyering is premised on the notion that the marginalized
position of the poor in the socio-economic system gives rise to
legal needs of an essentially different character than those of the
non-poor. 1 0 Because most of the legal problems of the poor flow
from their position of structural disadvantage, an intrinsic part of
the poverty lawyer's professional conceptualization is the handling
of legal issues on a systemic level, rather than expending resources
to resolve the individualized manifestations of deep-seated inequi-
ties. Emphasis is continually placed on the discernment of root
causes as the basis for strategic intervention on behalf of the poor.
The distinct philosophy of practice notwithstanding, poverty
lawyers have for the most part failed to mount an effective
challenge to social programing modelled on economic definitions of
poverty. While, for example, there has been an acknowledgment
that collective action designed to force the amendment of welfare
law is a more effective tool in the poverty lawyer's arsenal than is
individualized casework, the rationale for the very existence of a
social welfare system has but rarely been the object of criticism.
Poverty lawyers have struggled to improve the security of tenure
afforded tenants, rationalize the rules -governing unemployment
10. Wexler, "Practising Law for Poor People" (1970), 79 Yale L.J.
1049.
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insurance and improve the compensation structure for injured
workers. Poverty lawyers have not, however, worked to change the
socio-economic structures which ensure that some people will
always be poor. By tacitly accepting the appropriateness of an
economic formulation of poverty, lawyers who work with the poor
have been drawn into the game of responding to symptoms rather
than seeking out causes. The gains secured by poverty lawyers
through current modes of intervention may have attenuated the
suffering experienced by poor people, but they have not and will
not end poverty.
It might be suggested that the eradication of poverty is a role that
is fundamentally inconsistent with the professional and economic
status of lawyers.ll Lawyers are trained in the workings of the
existent social system and are valued because their specialized
knowledge of the system's functioning permits them to secure
advantages for their clients. In a radically transformed social
structure, current types of legal expertise might be rendered
largely irrelevant and the professional and economic security of
lawyers correspondingly jeopardized. Lawyers may therefore be
said to have a stake in the continuation of the socio-economic
status quo.
More charitably, it might be argued that even for lawyers prepared
to risk vested interests, the legal system has not traditionally
provided avenues of fundamental redress for systemically disen-
franchised classes. The entry into force of the equality rights
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 2 may
establish the requisite judicial vehicle for poverty lawyers to
effectively raise issues of equality of economic opportunity.
The equality rights provisions of the Constitution which entered
into force in April of this yearl 3 provide that
"15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in
particular, without discrimination based' on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
11. Heinkenbrankt, L'ambivalence du droit social.
12. Part I (ss. I to 34) of the Constitution Act, 1982, c.l1 (U.K.),
Schedule B.
13. In accordance with s.32(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, ss.15(l) and 15(2) entered into force on April
17, 1985.
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(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law,
program or activity that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals
or groups including those that are disadvantaged
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
To what extent, if at all, might litigation based on section 15 be
effective in fighting poverty as a systemic denial of economic
opportunity? While the rights of "the poor" to equality are not
explicitly safeguarded by the Charter, are their interests such as to
fall within the ambit of the general language of section 15? Are
there compelling policy reasons to argue that those who are denied
substantive equality by reason of the operation of our economic
system should be protected in a manner comparable to other
disadvantaged groups?
The American Experience
In attempting to grapple with the potential of constitutionally
entrenched equality rights to serve as a vehicle to attack poverty
defined as a systemic denial of economic opportunity, it may be
instructive to examine the judicial interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
the relevant portion of which provides that:14
"No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
While there are important distinctions to be drawn between the
statutory language and historical contexts of the Canadian and U.S.
equality provisions, the American equal protection cases do provide
effective illustrations of the conceptual issues that arise in
constitutional challenges to institutionalized poverty.
In scrutinizing legislation to ensure compliance with the equal
protection clause, American courts apply a sliding scale of
standards of judicial scrutiny. 15 At one extreme of the scale are
14. U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV, s.1 (1068).
15. Blattner, "The Supreme Court's 'Intermediate' Equal
Protection Decisions: Five Imperfect Models of
Constitutional Equality" (1981), 8 Hastings Const. L. Q. 777.
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those cases which allege discrimination that adversely affects a
discrete, identifiable minority group or involve a fundamental
interest. If the case alleges a rights violation against a suspect
classification of persons (particularly if defined by race) or
involves intrusion on a fundamental right (such as the right to vote
or to litigate), a standard of very strict scrutiny applies. 1 6 In such
cases the government must demonstrate that there is a compelling
state interest which legitimizes the denial of equal protection of
the law, and that the means employed to meet that state interest
were, in fact, necessary. Because of the difficulty of discharging
this burden of proof, legislation that has an adverse impact on an
identifiable minority group or results in the infringement of a
fundamental interest is likely to be struck down.
17
At the opposite end of the spectrum of judicial scrutiny are those
cases that allege a denial of a non-fundamental right to other than
a suspect classification. In such cases, the impugned law need only
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal in order to
stand.1 8 Furthermore, the person or group challenging the consti-
tutionality of the law has the obligation to establish the lack of
compliance with this standard. As a result, few laws affecting the
non-fundamental interests of persons who do not belong to a
specific minority group are successfully challenged.19
The attraction of close judicial scrutiny is therefore of major
importance in American equal protection cases. This, in turn, is a
function of whether the discrimination alleged affects a suspect
classification of persons or, if not, whether the right involved is
characterized as fundamental.
In regard to the first ground for close scrutiny, "the poor" have
been held not to constitute an identifiable minority in the same
sense as members of a racial minority. Justice Black, speaking for
the majority in James v. Valtierra, 2 0 endorsed the constitutionality
of a special referendum requirement to sanction the construction
of housing for 'low income persons". The court adopted a
restrictive interpretation of the suspect classification test, holding
16. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) at 994 ff.
17. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A
Preliminary Inquiry" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L. R. 131, at 140.
18. Tribe, supra note 16.
19. Gold, supra note 17.
20. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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that same would be met in the context of legislation affecting the
rights of poor people only if there were an allegation of racial
bias.
2 1
Furthermore, legislative distinctions on the basis of poverty have
been held not to raise questions of fundamental rights. There has
been a consistent reluctance on the part of the judiciary to expand
the scope of fundamental interests analysis to issues of economic
inequality. In the landmark case of Dandridge v. Williams, 2 2 the
Supreme Court was called upon to adjudicate the constitutionality
of a Maryland law which established a ceiling on welfare payments,
family size notwithstanding. The majority opinion of Justice
Stewart rejected the "right to subsistence theory" and held that
reasonable, though imperfect, economic classifications did not
violate the equal protection clause because there was no funda-
mental constitutional right to even a minimal standard of economic
security.
2 3
This view has been reinforced in two other kinds of cases. First, a
line of decisions dealing with the right to shelter in the context of
challenges to landlord-tenant and zoning laws has taken the
position that there is no denial of equal protection where the poor
have been effectively excluded from housing.2 4  Second, it has
21. The restrictive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
as directed at racial discrimination is based on its historical
rationale, namely the need to counteract the adoption by
numerous southern states after the abolition of slavery of
statutes designed to institutionalize discrimination against
blacks: Frank and Munro, "The Original Understanding of
'Equal Protection of the Laws,' " [1972 Wash. U. L. Q. 421,
445-446.
22. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
23. "[The] intractable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court. The Constitution may impose
certain procedural safeguards upon systems of welfare
administration. But the Constitution does not empower this
Court to second-guess state officials charged with the
difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare
funds among the myriad of potential recipients": Justice
Stewart's majority opinion, supra note 22.
24. Lindsey v. Normet 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Warth v. Seldin 422
U.S. 490 (1975); Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises 426 U.S.
668 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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been held that even where exclusionary laws lead necessarily to a
reduction of educational opportunities for the poor, there is no
absence of equal protection. 2 5 It has been observed that " ...
governmental actions designed to isolate the poorer classes and
prevent their acquisition and use of real property are themselves
presumed to be legitimate governmental objectives."
2 6
In sum, the American position is that systemic economic
inequalities do not abridge the right to equal protection, as the
poor are neither members of a recognizable minority nor seeking to
assert rights which may properly be deemed fundamental.
Prospects for a Canadian Interpretation of Equality Rights
Favorable to the Redress of Systemic Inequality of Economic
Opportunity
On the basis of the American approach to scrutiny of equal
protection cases, one might expect little to be gained by seeking to
establish the right to equality of economic opportunity via
constitutional litigation. To what extent, then, is the Canadian
equality rights clause likely to be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the U.S. caselaw?
The first issue to be considered is whether the rationale for
establishing variant levels of judicial scrutiny of equal protection
cases is applicable to Canada, and, if not, whether differential
scrutiny is nonetheless warranted on other grounds. The suspect
classification arm of the American test is rooted in the dynamics
of United States history, in particular the need to scrupulously
examine all laws which in form or application create distinctions
based on race. 2 7 In view of the record of institutionalized racism
25. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
26. Binion, "The Disadvantaged Before the Burger Court" (1982),
4 Law & Policy Q. 37, at 50-51.
27. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted during the period
immediately following the Civil War, and was designed to
counteract the rash of state legislation which sought to
negate the impact of the Emancipation Proclamation by
applying unequal penalties to blacks convicted of crimes and
imposing a host of restraints on their business and employ-
ment activities: see Bickel, 'The Original Understanding and
the Segregation D5 cision" (1955), 69 Harv. L.R. 1.
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in American legislation, and the resultant history of significant
social conflict, such special vigilance is no doubt warranted. In
Canada, however, there is not a parallel tradition of legalized
racial discrimination leading to social upheaval, as a result of
which the argument for this form of special scrutiny is absent.
The fundamental interest test as a basis for strict judicial scrutiny
in regard to equality rights is also largely inappropriate to the
Canadian context. The American Fourteenth Amendment does not
provide any explicit guidance in regard to the kinds of inequality it
was designed to proscribe; 2 8 as a result, it was both logical and
necessary that the judiciary develop rules which permit systematic
judgments to be made in regard to the kinds of issues that should
be examined as potential violations of the equal protection clause.
In Canada, there is no need for such judicial categorizations as the
Charter makes express reference to a variety of classifications
that must attract judicial scrutiny 2 9 and furthermore explicitly
directs the courts to hear claims in regard to other, non-
enumerated forms of discrimination.
3 0
On the assumption that the bases for requiring different levels of
judicial scrutiny of equal protection cases in the United States are
not applicable to the Canadian situation, might we nonetheless feel
compelled to make a distinction in the degree of scrutiny to be
applied on the basis of whether or not the claim rests on an
enumerated or a non-enumerated ground of discrimination? On the
one hand, it might be argued that no such distinction should be
made as the equality rights provision of the Canadian Constitution
evinces a clear legislative intention to eliminate discrimination
however motivated, as a result of which relatively strict judicial
scrutiny should be the norm in regard to all claims under section
15. Alternatively, it might be suggested that although the general
28. Rather, it merely precludes the denial of equal protection of
the laws in general terms: U.S. Constitution, Amendment
XIV, s.l (1868).
29. The specified classifications are race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability: Canadian Charter of Rights.and Freedoms, s.15(1),
supra note 12.
30. The enumerated classifications "... do not exhaust the bar
against legal discrimination. Section 15 requires that there
be no discrimination in the protection or benefits provided by
law:- Russell, 'The Effect of a Charter of Rights on the
Policy-Making Role of Canadian Courts" (1982), 25 Can. Pub.
Admin. 1, at 25.
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wording of the provision certainly contemplates the extension of
equality rights protection to other than the specified groups, the
express reference to certain prohibited grounds for discrimination
may be seen to impose a more strict burden of proof on those
alleging discrimination on a non-enumerated ground. While the
Constitution implies that discrimination for a listed reason is
presumptively wrong, such harm must be affirmatively established
in the case of other forms of discrimination. The greater precision
of language in the Canadian Constitution may be argued to make
the logic of a dichotomous approach to judicial scrutiny of equal
protection claims even stronger here than in the United States.
Had the drafters of the Constitution viewed inequality based on
economic status as inherently wrong, an express prohibition of such
discrimination would presumably have been included in section
15(1). Because there is no such reference, litigants asserting this
kind of claim may well be faced with a relaxed standard of judicial
scrutiny. 3
1
Whichever of the above interpretations of the differential judicial
scrutiny argument is ultimately adopted, broadly based claims to
equality of economic opportunity should not be dismissed as readily
in Canada as under the American precedents. At worst, the
Canadian poor should face the necessity of establishing harm
resulting from differential treatment as proof of discrimination.
This obligation, while not insignificant, is nonetheless clearly
preferable to the historically straitjacketed American threshold
test.
Insofar as we may succeed in attracting judicial scrutiny to a claim
for equality of economic opportunity, does the scope of the
equality rights provision provide for an effective head of redress?
The American Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees only
"equal protection of the lawst, has been construed to establish
political rather than economic rights. Equal protection of the law
is, however, but one of four heads of equality established by
section 15 of the Charter. In addition to equal protection, the
Canadian enactment guarantees equality before the law, equality
under the law and, most important, equal benefit of the law. In
light of the intention of the legislative drafters to move beyond
31. This analysis assumes that the named groups were included in
section 15 for principled reasons. One commentator
suggests, however, that this was not the case: "Section 15
was developed primarily on public relations grounds as a
means of co-opting highly visible and vocal interest groups
into supporting the Trudeau government's unilateral
constitutional restructuring": Russell, supra note 30, at 26.
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narrow interpretations of equality, 3 2 it seems open to assert that
the statutory language supports an interpretation that bars the
inequitable assignment of societal benefits by legislation. 3 3 While
the government might assert a compelling state interest that
justifies some form of preferential benefit, section 15 may now
provide a basis in law to argue that legislation which effects or
regulates the distribution of social goods must be prima facie non-
discriminatory in its application. This principle is potentially a
basis for asserting a remedy on behalf of those denied equality of
economic opportunity by virtue of a statutorily sanctioned scheme.
If accepted, such an interpretation could render unconstitutional
the kind of laws held to be valid in the United States which
effectively established distinct legal requirements for poor
people. 3 4
32. Gold, supra note 17, at 135.
33. It has been argued that such an interpretation is inconsistent
with the legislative history of the phrase which was created
to "ensure that the provision of governmental benefits (like
unemployment insurance) was not insulated from judicial
review merely because such benefits are creations of the
legislature": Gold, sur note 17, at 136. The broad language
of the phrase "equal benefit of the law" seems entirely too
expansive to accomplish such a narrow, technical objective.
In any event, it is suggested that the interpretation offered
could render the phrase "equal benefit of the law" redundant
as the desired result of ensuring judicial review of decisions
affecting the payment of government benefits might be
secured by the application of the guarantee of "equality
under the law." Another commentator has objected to the
interpretation of "equal benefit of the law" in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of those words on the ground that
"[this] requirement if taken literally would condemn most of
the contents of federal and provincial statute books to the
shredder, as one of the prime purposes of law is to
redistribute wealth and opportunity in ways that favour some
and penalize others": Russell, supra note 30, at 25. This
analysis seems to be at odds with the principle established in
Grey v. Pearson which holds that "the ordinary meaning may
be modified where that meaning results in some objective
repugnance, inconsistency, or absurdity, [but] not where it
leads to consequences considered to be absurd or unjust":
Driedger, Construction of Statutes (1983), at 2.
34. See text supra at notes 24, 25.
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This kind of progressive interpretation of the equality rights
provision would be in line with the international tendency to define
the principle of non-discrimination in both political and economic
terms. Rather than merely enunciating a philosophy of
egalitarianism, modern international human rights law holds that
"... regardless of their many differences, [all persons] are
entitled to protection from those man-made and avoidable
impositions of oppressive power which would restrict the
development of their individual potentials." 3 5  As such, the
European Court of Human Rights has held that states are obligated
to effectuate access to political rights by the elimination of
economic obstacles. 3
6
A potential pitfall in advancing such a systemically focused
application of section 15 is that the interpretation of the Canadian
equality rights clause is explicitly restrained by section 1 of the
Constitution pursuant to which the guarantees of rights and
freedoms are made subject to
"... such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."
It might logically be argued that a right to equality of economic
opportunity is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic values of
our "free and democratic" capitalist society. That is, insofar as
the nature of our economic system is seen as a fundamental aspect
of the Canadian way of life, a constitutional challenge to laws
which reinforce the systemic inequities necessary to sustain that
system may well fail in light of the limitation imposed by section
1. In the American context, for example, equality of economic
opportunity has been criticized as an unacceptable principle in a
35. Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights (1983), at
18.
36. The leading case of the European Court of Human Rights on
this point is Airey v. Ireland (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 305 in which
it was held that the right of access to a court cannot be
viewed as a mere political right which can be rendered
inoperative by economic or other obstacles. Having found
that the plaintiff did not have the financial resources to
secure the assistance of counsel in an action for judicial
separation, and that she had not been provided with access to
counsel, the Court held that her right to have her civil rights
and obligations determined by a fair and public hearing had
been effectively breached.
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society generally committed to a market pricing system. 3 7 While
there is at least some tentative indication that our courts may not
be inclined to take such a a conservative position,3 8 the express
language of section 1 could make the adoption of a non-
interventionist approach by our judiciary in the context of an
equality rights challenge fatal to constitutional efforts to end
endemic poverty.
In what way should poverty lawyers seek to make use of the
equality rights clause of the Constitution? On the one hand, there
appears to be at least a conceptual possibility that equality rights
litigation might serve as an effective vehicle to promote the
alleviation of poverty defined in structural terms. The Canadian
enactment is much broader in scope and more explicit in intent
than the American Fourteenth Amendment, and is not a product of
the same historical tradition of entrenched discrimination.
Furthermore, an interpretation of section 15 which recognizes both
political and economic rights would be consonant with general
37. Michelman, "Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment" (1969), 83 Harv. L.R. 7.
38. There may be at least some room for optimism in light of
obiter in two recent judgments which interpreted the
Charter. In the first case, it was held that Canada was
properly viewed as a "free and democratic society" because it
had permitted the rise to power of the Parti Quebecois "on
the basis of a programme the aim of which is the dismember-
ment of this federation": Quebec Association of Protestant
School Boards et al v. Attorney-General of Quebec et al (No.
2) (1982), 140 DLR (3d) 33, (Que. Sup. Ct., appeals dismissed
in Que. C.A. and S.C.C.) at 66-67. This remark implies that
fundamental social reform is consistent with, rather than in
any sense antithetical to, the notion of Canada as a free and
democratic nation. In a second case which addressed the
scope of the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the
Ontario Divisional Court noted that "... the 'free market' is
itself only an idea, one particular idea, about how goods
should be distributed in a society. It being only an idea about
how goods should be allocated among citizens, there is
nothing to prevent society from deciding that some other
method of allocation is better": Klein and Dvorak v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, unreported case 49/84 (February 4,
1985). While in both of these cases the courts elected to take
a non-interventionist stance, the extent of judicial openness
to discussion of systemic change may be viewed as
encouraging.
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principles of international human rights law and the jurisprudence
under the European Convention.
A somewhat less ambitious strategy would focus on the potential
for equality rights litigation to serve as an important means of re-
focusing the discussion of poverty issues on fundamental questions
of socio-economic structure. While the potential for success in
legal argument may well be foreclosed by the political intervention
of those with vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo,
poverty lawyers might play a useful role by facilitating a direct
confrontation between opposing economic interests. For far too
long, there has been relative silence on the part of advocates for
the poor in regard to the hard issues of structurally imposed
economic discrimination. While poverty lawyers should not expect
that their energies can end poverty, they can and should employ
their skills to sensitize their clients and their clients' oppressors to
the underlying inequalities inherent in our socio-economic system.
The opportunities created by the constitutional enactment of
equality rights may usefully contribute to this goal.
